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Rethinking Repression
Where Do We Go from Here?
Le e A . Sm i t h e y a n d Le s t e r R . Ku r t z

Drawing together the expertise of a global collection of social scientists and activists, we have interrogated a central dynamic of nonviolent civil resistance, the paradox of repression. Why and under
what circumstances does repression against activists using nonviolent
methods and tactics backfire, undermining the legitimacy of authorities and mobilizing greater participation in civil resistance? We also
focus on the practical application of knowledge about repression and
backfire by nonviolent activists. How can the paradox of repression be
cultivated? How can activists prepare for, manage, and blunt the negative impact of repression?
Some readers may chafe at the lack of a unifying definition or
theory of repression. We chose not to spend a great deal of energy on
coming to a consensus among all of the volume’s contributors about
the parameters of “repression” (as opposed to oppression, suppression,
etc.) so as to avoid cutting ourselves off from exploring fertile ground
and important discoveries.
Some of our contributors define the paradox of repression as any
unanticipated consequences of repression that authorities do not desire.
Others complicate the concept of repression by delineating a range of
repression types. We suggest in the introduction, further developed in
chapter 8, that we consider repression along a continuum from overt
violence, on one end, to hegemony (in which individuals self-censor)
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12.1. A Continuum of Demobilization (Source: Lee A. Smithey and Lester
R. Kurtz)

on the other (see Figure 12.1). In a series of quantitative and theoretical overviews, as well as case studies from around the world, we have
brought together insights from scholars and experienced activists to
explore this crucial topic.
Issues and Themes
We believe that our approach has helped to generate exciting new
insights and identified several important subdomains and avenues for
further research. In this volume, we have explored a wide range of
themes and issues around the paradox of repression, notably:
• the relational conception of power,
• agents of repression and the possibility of defections,
• strategic preparation for repression and overcoming fear,
• whether activists should deliberately provoke repression,
• the importance of mobilization,
• the role of external actors,
• cultural aspects of repression and its management,
• expanding frameworks for understanding repression,
• social psychological dimensions, and
• the role of the media and the issue of framing.
The Relational Conception of Power
In this volume, we focus on conflicts that are perceived as asymmetrical while at the same time suggesting that they are more symmetrical
than they seem. The paradox of repression makes more sense when
we understand that power is a relational social construct that emerges
from negotiated interactions between people with different statuses,
knowledge, and resources in a society. We discuss this at some length
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in the introductory chapter, starting with Simmel and Gandhi, and
the feminist distinction between empowerment (power to) and domination (power over). In his seminal work on conflict, German sociologist Georg Simmel (1971) stresses the importance of understanding
conflict as relational and interactional, an aspect of a struggle that is
crucial to understanding the dynamics of repression and its backfire.
Each party to a conflict is engaged in a meaningful exchange, according to Simmel, in which each responds to the actions and statements
of the other, suggesting that power disparities are often not as severe
as we might think.
Gandhi insisted, for example, that the British did not take India,
but that the Indians gave it to them—after all, one hundred thousand soldiers could not control 350 million Indians unless the Indians
cooperated with them. The apparent asymmetries of power can be
profoundly affected when authority is abused or resisted. Moreover, as
Arendt (1969, 1970) notes, violence does not create power; instead, it is
used by people who lack power or feel it slipping away.
Furthermore, opponents in conflict are working to influence one
another through planned or strategic moves, either persuading, coercing, or bargaining (Kriesberg 1982). Situations involving strategic
nonviolent action are no exception. Understanding the most effective
means of waging nonviolent resistance has been the subject of decades
of research and is reflected in many of the chapters in this volume.
However, if we are to truly understand nonviolent resistance as part of
conflict, we must also understand it as an interaction of activists with
authorities and even agents of repression.
Agents of Repression and Defectors
The decision-making processes among regime functionaries is crucial. Erica Chenoweth (chapter 2) shows that defections among security forces and elites are a crucial factor determining the outcome of
nonviolent resistance campaigns, along with the level of movement
participation (the most crucial factor) and withdrawal of support by
foreign allies. In a backfire situation, when state repression increases,
so does domestic condemnation of the regime; defections are more
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likely, however, with more media coverage. Moreover, it is possible
that extremely intense repression can have a negative indirect effect
on campaign success by reducing the size of subsequent campaigns.
The growing emphasis on defections means that we need further
research on nonviolent struggle from the perspective of regimes and
their agents, so we have incorporated that key aspect of repression
in this book, even as it admittedly poses methodological challenges
because of problems with access. We seem to know much more about
the strategic efforts of social movement organizations than those of
corporations, states, and other large institutions and their functionaries, although there are clues to the authorities’ point of view and sometimes, as with Eric Nelson’s (2013) “Subversion of Social Movements
by Adversarial Agents,” some responses to movement challengers are
discussed openly in the strategic literature.
In chapter 4, Rachel MacNair explores the psychological costs to
agents of repression in terms of what she calls perpetration-induced
traumatic stress (see also MacNair 2002). Indeed, she argues, “the
trauma of violence is actually more severe for perpetrators than victims.” This psychological consequence of engaging in repression could
potentially lead to defections by security forces, one of the factors that
Chenoweth (chapter 2) found contributed to successful outcomes for
an insurgency.
Agents of repression strategize about repression in order to maximize its demobilization effects and minimize its negative consequences,
although most of the sociological research has interrogated the movement side of conflicts rather than exploring the role of repressive elites.
That is the subject of our chapter on “smart” repression (chapter 8), in
which we present the impulse of authorities to counterstrategize and
develop tactics and methods intended to anticipate and create dilemmas for activists, much as activists attempt to do through their strategizing. Beyer and Earl (chapter 5) discuss how authorities not only try
to block access to Internet sites but sometimes repress online activities
offline. Two people were arrested during the G20 public protests in
Pittsburgh, for example, because of their Twitter use regarding the
actions, and authorities sentenced two young men for their Facebook
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posts following August 2011 riots in the United Kingdom, neither of
whom had participated in the riots themselves (Bowcott, Siddique,
and Sparrow 2011; Citizen Media Law Project 2010; Moynihan 2009).
In an effort to minimize backfire, authorities sometimes move away
from overt violence to “less-lethal methods,” intimidation, manipulation, and soft repression. The hegemonic strategies employed by political regimes are perhaps not entirely unlike the persuasive strategies
developed by activists to encourage defections among police and the
military, often by appeals to a common national or universal identity. Both sides try to choreograph the dance that adversaries share in
movement-countermovement interactions.
One extreme case of this move away from violence was the Egyptian military’s role in the Egyptian revolution of 2011, explored in
chapter 9 by Dalia Ziada. Ziada notes that early on in the uprising, a
triangle of actors emerged—the police, military, and protesters—and
the nonviolent response of insurgents to police repression facilitated
an emerging alliance with the military. Egyptian activists and military
personnel engaged in mutual interaction, each trying to persuade the
other. Eschewing their routine tactics of brute repression, the military
first deployed “negative cooperation” by not shooting at demonstrators, eventually withdrawing their support from the Mubarak regime
altogether and enabling his downfall, but eventually wresting control
of the revolution away from organizers of the insurgency.
Ironically, the Egyptian military’s success without violence underscores a fundamental principle of nonviolent civil resistance: power can
be generated in multiple ways. As MacNair underscores, “power is not a
physical property but a psychological experience” (chapter 4). Another
powerful social psychological dimension of the repression dynamic is
fear, the overcoming of which becomes a central aspect of strategic
preparation, another prominent theme that emerged in these studies.
Preparing for Repression and Overcoming Fear
Preparation is one of the keys for a campaign to manage repression
successfully and provoke its backfire against elites who try to demobilize a movement. Two of our authors who are also activists, George
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Lakey (chapter 11) and Jenni Williams (chapter 6), emphasize the fear
factor and the importance of strategic planning that addresses what
happens before repressive events, how activists expect to respond
when repression occurs, and how it is to be framed after the fact to
highlight its injustice for a broader relevant audience. This work is
especially important in managing fear.
Advance training of activists allows them to reframe repression
meaningfully before and after it happens, such as tapping into the resonance of cultural themes of sacrifice. They can set in place structures
like affinity groups that highlight the solidarity of common action.
Organizers can choreograph actions so that they enhance the positive
aspects of the repressive experience and make violent repression more
difficult—like people kneeling to pray as the police attack rather than
running away.
George Lakey (chapter 11) emphasizes the significance of “ways
that activists have found to handle fear, make meaning of pain and
suffering, and support risk-taking so violent repression will not shut
down their movements.” One such strategy is turning fear into excitement, taking the energy that fear generates and reframing it as an
opportunity to act side by side with communities of like-minded,
change-oriented people.
Jenni Williams (chapter 6) describes how Women of Zimbabwe
Arise (WOZA) proactively replaced a culture of fear with one of resistance in order to move people from isolation to solidarity. She relates
a story of being arrested at a march for leading a protest and those
with her insisting that they be arrested with her. The culture of fear
melted away as the police vehicle became so full of protesters she had
to squeeze in and take her place among the others police arrested. The
casting off of fear by WOZA members allowed them to undertake
increasingly bold actions without inciting repression.
Provocation
When the civil rights campaign to desegregate public facilities waned
in Birmingham, Alabama, some leaders wanted to organize a demonstration with willing young people because the leaders anticipated that
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repression of such a march would likely backfire. Others, including
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., at first objected to putting young people
in harm’s way. When they did eventually proceed with the Children’s
March, police attacked the teenage demonstrators with firehoses
and dogs, producing widespread moral outrage (Oppenheimer 1995;
Wicker 1963; Houston 2004). President Kennedy appeared on national
television the following day telling the nation that it faced a “moral
crisis,” calling upon Congress to pass “sweeping legislation to speed
school desegregation and open public facilities to every American,
regardless of color” (Wicker 1963). This event was a classic case of the
paradox of repression, but the question remains: is preparing strategically for repression tantamount to provoking it? The question has
been a tender subject in the study of nonviolent civil resistance.
While Gandhi may not call for the provocation of opponents, he
declares that nonviolence often involves taking on suffering rather
than inflicting it. Whether that necessarily involves strategically provoking repression remains a matter for debate. Some feel that much of
the power of nonviolent action lies in the purity of a nonviolent discipline that is easily contrasted with the brutality of open repression. In
chapter 7, we argue that a fundamental goal of nonviolent resistance is
to proactively heighten the contrast between the nonviolent discipline
of activists and elite repression.
There may be a fuzzy line between preparing for repression to
heighten backfire (knowing that it may work to a campaign’s advantage)
and actually provoking repression. In the 1970s, George Lakey ([1973]
2012), introduced the concept of dilemma demonstrations, in which
activists develop actions that put authorities in positions where most
or all their options might generate advantages for challengers (see also
Sørensen and Martin 2014). This approach may include ensuring that
any repression is certain to undermine authorities’ legitimacy. However, Lakey warns against provoking repression because “provocation
may alienate the revolutionaries from the people, brutalize the police,
and even brutalize the demonstrators” ([1973] 2012, 144). Moreover,
he argues that provocation is tantamount to a manipulation that risks
disaffecting both the public and the rank and file of the movement.
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“The organizers should never be in a position of depending on the
authorities to react violently in order to make their point” (145).
Activists can be pleased when repression does not come, even if it
could benefit the movement, but that does not bar them from optimizing backfire as a matter of prudence. Jenni Williams says that members of WOZA knowingly put themselves in situations that risked
repression and that they took responsibility for being part of such a
confrontational dynamic. Both Lakey and Williams stop short of calling for outright provocation of repression. In fact, in chapter 6, Williams describes how WOZA choreographs their marches proactively
to avoid provoking repression. They stop after every city block to sit
and recite their commitment to nonviolence before moving on.
Mobilization’s Significance
The mobilization of many participants enhances both the paradox of
repression and chances of a movement’s success (see Chenoweth and
Stefan 2011). Successful repression management requires mobilizing
participants, bystanders, and even potential defectors from the forces
of repression. Erica Chenoweth (chapter 2) found that the level of participation was a prime factor in determining the success of a movement
and also in shaping backfire against repression. We speculate that wider
participation means greater exposure to repression and thus a greater
likelihood that those in victims’ networks, and perhaps the broader
public, would become outraged. Larger actions are also more likely to
attract the domestic media attention that Chenoweth says is important, and are more likely to be diverse and thus include populations,
such as women and children, that raise the potential cost of repression.
Moreover, when backfire occurs, it mobilizes more people to participate and to defect, as Doron Shultziner (chapter 3) notes was the
case in the killing of a schoolboy in Soweto and the arrest of Rosa
Parks in Montgomery. Such events radically change the political climate, transforming people within the movement and the broader society, inspiring people to act.
Jenni Williams approaches mobilization from the ground level of
a movement organizer. In chapter 6, she relates how WOZA mobilized
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women to speak out, forging “a movement that opened up a new center lane in a highly polarized society.” Their main strategy broke stereotypes about women as well as the hold of patriarchy on society,
empowering women to build a culture of resistance that replaced the
existing culture of fear and creating a climate in which mobilization could occur. Then, in a kind of reversal in the emerging cycle of
repression and backfire, the women took advantage of their successful
mobilization, forcing police to beg a large crowd of twenty arrested
protesters and 180 of their supporters to leave the police station they
had occupied—in a sense, “unarresting” them and capitulating to the
growing power of WOZA.
External Factors
Although the civil resistance literature understandably focuses on the
agency of nonviolent actionists, the role of external actors remains
significant. The audience for insurgent actions is often not geographically present; indeed, the key actors in the paradox of repression are
often in another part of the country or even the globe. Chenoweth’s
data reveals starkly the importance of regime allies and international
media coverage of repressive events, which often erodes international
support for a repressive regime. She finds that, once a regime ally
withdraws support, the chances for success among the largest campaigns doubles; and when this is combined with “security force loyalty
shifts and elite defections, . . . the chance of success rockets up to about
45 percent for the smallest campaigns and 85 percent for the largest”
(chapter 2).
Doron Shultziner also identifies significant external factors in the
creation of transformative events. Instances of repression and backfire
can cascade into large-scale, system-shaking occurrences on the international stage that are not of the movement’s making, causing transnational ripple effects. Backfire often occurs at other times and in other
spaces than the repressive events themselves. Tunisia’s rapid revolution, which was launched with a provocative act of self-immolation
dramatizing injustice, inspired Egypt’s, as Dalia Ziada notes (chapter
9), just as the massacre at Tiananmen Square in June 1989 shaped the
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trajectory of uprisings in Poland and Germany, as we point out in our
introductory chapter.
In short, agency is enhanced by an understanding of “political
opportunity structures,” the configuration of factors constraining
and favoring movement development. The campaigns most likely to
take advantage of backfire may be those who recognize transformative moments of repression and how to strike the anvil when the fire
is hot.
Managing Repression in the Cultural Domain
The paradox of repression is as much about culture as it is about politics, and it is often the more culturally creative strategies and tactics
that shape political action rather than the other way around. Doron
Shultziner’s contribution to our understanding of backfire is, in large
part, his understanding of repressive events as transformative because
they resonate with a cultural context, disrupting and shaping it, and
changing people and institutions in the process. As in anthropologist Victor Turner’s (1967) concept of liminality, these iconic cultural
moments turn the social world upside down. Such moments are often
generated during rituals like the Mardi Gras parade during which
the princess of spring dethrones old man winter. In the paradox of
repression, the regime, whose legitimacy is usually taken for granted,
suddenly becomes a monster slaying innocents and against which
right-thinking bystanding publics should rebel.
Brian Martin, in his foreword to this volume, suggests that activists counter each one of the methods authorities use to reduce outrage
in order to reshape the frame that the public uses to interpret repressive events: “exposing the action, validating the target, interpreting
the events as an injustice, mobilizing support (and avoiding official
channels), and resisting intimidation and rewards.”
In chapter 10, Chaiwat Satha-Anand describes a “nonviolent explosion” of creative nonviolent actions across Thailand as a response to
repressive violence. Nonviolent resistance became possible because of
“how the political space left from repression interacted with alternative leadership from within the movement and a history of nonviolent
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resistance in Thai society.” Culturally savvy leaders took advantage
of a violent turn in the otherwise nonviolent Red Shirts movement,
and the ensuing brutal repression caused the Red Shirts movement to
collapse in May 2010. Protest leader Sombat Boonngamanong cried
for days after the violent repression and channeled that energy into
Facebook posts. Then, a new nonviolent resistance called Red Sunday challenged the emergency law prohibiting political gatherings;
protesters tied red ribbons at the site of the demonstration that had
been brutally repressed by the military. Rather than high-risk public
demonstrations, the Red Sunday group held aerobic dances and used
humor and cultural symbols to help people overcome the fear that
the regime had promoted. Much of the struggle in Thailand was thus
waged in the cultural and psychological arena.
Similarly, George Lakey (chapter 11) emphasizes the importance
of the stories a movement’s activists tell to themselves to make meaning out of the suffering they receive at the hands of those in power,
often by refashioning ancient themes of suffering, martyrdom, and
spiritual transformation in their cultural traditions.
Establishing meaning also figures prominently in our analysis of
how a movement choreographs its acts of resistance, and the cultural
contexts in which activists operate are always important, as we discuss
in chapter 7. Insurgents thus generate frame resonance between movement goals and widely held cultural values to mobilize both potential participants in a movement and possible defectors from the power
structure. Thus, Williams (in chapter 6) reflects on how WOZA participants transformed the authority of a traditional cultural role—that
of the mother—into a vehicle for protest as they courageously scolded
Robert Mugabe and the political elites for their unacceptable behavior
as exploitative leaders of the country. In chapter 7, we apply the fundamental importance of framing and meaning-making to repression
management and argue that the way activists “set the table” (culturally, through their tactical decisions) establishes crucial precedents for
the interpretation of repression in their favor. The symbols resistors
use and the narratives on which they draw prestructure the range of
possible interpretations of moments of repression and enhance the
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perceptual contrast between the bullying tactics of opponents and the
nonviolent discipline of activists.
Expanding Frameworks for Understanding Repression
Despite decades of theorizing and research into nonviolent civil resistance, the study of what has been called political jiu-jitsu (Sharp 1973),
moral jiu-jitsu (Gregg 1938), backlash (Francisco 1995, 1996), or backfire (Martin 2007, 2012) remains relatively underdeveloped. As Beyer
and Earl point out in chapter 5, there is a tendency to lump all forms
of repression into one category, perhaps because methodologically it
is easier to study spectacular and overt forms of physical repression
that attract media coverage and generate moral outrage. However, as
research progresses, we are bound to refine our study of nonviolent
resistance, nonviolent organizations and movements, and the regimes
and corporations that they challenge. This volume begins to outline
the diverse types of movement and regime goals and actions that inevitably interact to generate various movement outcomes, including the
paradox of repression.
Beyer and Earl take us into the burgeoning world of online activism that has a different set of ground rules (physics even) that govern
the strategic interaction of opponents. They systematically enumerate
different types of online resistance, such as denial of service attacks
(often leading to arrests), networking, and information sharing. Likewise, they present alternative forms of repression most likely to be
deployed against online activist strategies.
Observing a continuum of repression strategies that authorities
employ to demobilize nonviolent movements, as we do in the introduction, enhances our conceptualization of repression by offering a higher
resolution view of the concept (Figure 12.1), and Erica Chenoweth
calls us to think more carefully about how the intentions of repressive
actors may be difficult to discern as scholars try to reconstruct retrospective accounts of repression. Moreover, Dalia Ziada alerts us to the
potential for multiple targets of repression. Simple dyadic models of
regimes and dissenters may exclude repression against defectors and
various resistance flanks.
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Social Psychological Dimensions
Rachel MacNair’s observation that power “is a psychological experience” (chapter 4) strikes us as a patently true but underestimated
aspect of nonviolent strategic action. Like MacNair, Doron Shultziner
focuses on transformative repressive events as psychological phenomena; chapter 3 hinges heavily on the mass perception that “‘politics as
usual’ is suspended” and “the creation of new spaces and mass meetings inject new meaning, perspective, and points of reference to citizens’ lives.”
Fear emerges as one of the most fundamental psychological dynamics at play in nonviolent civil resistance. Gandhi wrote extensively
about the importance of overcoming fear, arguing, “we cannot have too
much bravery, too much self-sacrifice . . . I want . . . the greater bravery
of the meek, the gentle and the nonviolent, the bravery that will mount
the gallows without injuring, or harbouring any thought of injury to
a single soul” (1967, see chapter 12 in “The Gospel of Fearlessness”).
Gene Sharp (1973) has established overcoming fear as a fundamental
principle of effective nonviolent resistance, noting that people obey authorities for a variety of reasons ranging from habit to fear, all of which
can be helpfully studied through psychological lenses. Sharp points out
that repression is not actually the generator of obedience, but the fear
that repression creates. No regime can repress all of its people. It is the
threat of repression that people fear, dissuading them from challenging
injustices. Thus, overcoming fear is largely about altering perceptions.
George Lakey explains how storytelling becomes a collective and therapeutic way of shifting perceptions of fear and managing repression.
Similarly, Jenni Williams also relays the slow but intentional empowerment of women in Zimbabwe as a form of fear management.
In trying to expand frameworks for understanding repression, we
must also strive to understand conflict from the perspective of agents
of repression, as MacNair does in her chapter on how perpetration
induced traumatic stress syndrome likely impacts many agents of
repression and the likelihood that they may modify their repression,
disobey orders, or even defect.
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Framing and the Media
Because of the reciprocal nature of conflict, insurgent challenges and
elite responses evolve into framing contests, with each party trying to
mobilize support and resonate with significant themes within shared
culture. These framing contests are profoundly shaped by the media,
especially beyond a local level, where people do not experience them
firsthand. How the media portrays their respective frames shapes the
public’s discourse about the issues at stake, a fact of which the various
parties involved are usually quite aware. The media effect is embellished by the fact that repressive events are often the most newsworthy.
Chenoweth’s (chapter 2) study of 323 campaigns for dramatic
change, such as bringing down dictators or driving out occupations,
concludes that the most significant processes leading to campaign success historically are “campaign size, loyalty shifts among regime functionaries, and the removal of support for the regime by an erstwhile
ally.” “For repression to backfire in any meaningful sense,” she argues,
“participation is crucial.” One vital factor in mobilizing participation,
especially on a broader geographical scale, is international media coverage, which raises awareness and pressures regime allies to withdraw
support of the target regime.
Media coverage is not enough, however (surprisingly, domestic
media coverage had no significant effect in Chenoweth’s study); and
we know from the extensive social movement literature that framing
issues is one of the core tasks of social movements. We argue in chapter 7 that the framing contest between elites and movements must
result in a shift in control of political discourse from elites to movement coalitions and that repressive events are critical sites of framing contention. Repression management to enhance backfire requires
that insurgents’ frames resonate with existing cultural norms and
dispositions and that the careful choreography of strategic nonviolent
action in the face of repression can go a long way toward ensuring
that repression is more likely to backfire by boldly dramatizing the
dissonance between authorities’ repression and the nonviolence of disciplined activists.
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Future Research
A number of the issues emerging in this volume have been inadequately
studied or conceptualized and could be fruitfully explored. First,
it would be helpful to have more focused case studies of nonviolent
resistance under repression, on the one hand, and more big-picture
explorations, either with quantitative data sets or conceptualizations,
on the other. Case studies like those in this volume on Zimbabwe, the
US civil rights movement, and the South African antiapartheid struggle, as well as movements for change in Thailand, Egypt, and online,
provide in-depth insights into the actual processes set into motion by
repressive events and movement responses to them. We need more onthe-ground case studies that focus specifically on repression to develop
a better comparative historical basis for understanding which aspects
of backfire are more general and which are more situation-specific.
Chenoweth’s NAVCO data set1 reveals a rich set of broad patterns
regarding repression of particular types of campaigns (overthrowing
dictators, removing occupying troops, and secessionist movements).
Her new data set, NAVCO 2.0 (see Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) includes more cases and data that should give us further insights. It would
be helpful to explore other large data sets in terms of repression issues
and one such possibility is the Global Nonviolent Action Database,2 which
offers a growing selection of cases featuring the paradox of repression.
Conceptual issues in need of development and empirical investigation include the question of how the use of violence (regardless
of by whom) actually undermines the legitimacy of the perpetrator
among insider elites and within the broader population. Do non-state
terror organizations suffer a loss of legitimacy when they use violent
methods? If so, are they as great as those incurred by states and other
authority structures?

1. This data set can be found at the NAVCO Data Project website (https://www
.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html).
2. This database (nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu), housed at Swarthmore College,
includes a selection of cases featuring the paradox of repression (bit.ly/pdoxrepgnad).
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At the same time, we need research into the power elite side of
framing contests. Most sociological studies of repression explore the
social movement side of conflicts, paying less attention to the elite
side, in part because of a lack of access to the latter. In our exploration
of smart repression, we found some interesting research along those
lines, and there is no doubt much more to be discovered.
MacNair’s chapter on perpetration-induced traumatic stress
suggests another crucial area, the psychological aspects of repression from the point of view of those actors attempting to demobilize
a movement. Psychological costs may be associated with the use of
violence that could be counted as part of the paradoxical nature of
repression. Research into perpetration-induced posttraumatic stress
disorder (Grossman and Siddle 2008; MacNair 2002) suggests that the
relational nature of conflict can cause psychological distress among
those who use violence. Future research should explore to what extent
the use of violence carries psychological costs and whether and how
those costs can be leveraged by others.
Both additional case studies and quantitative overviews might provide insights into the most successful tactics of repression management
used by various movements for different kinds of change in particular
sociocultural contexts. Indeed, one important issue often debated but
inadequately researched is the relative impact of tactics on the one
hand, and context, on the other, or what is sometimes called agency
and structure. The nonviolence literature often emphasizes agency,
while sociologists and many political scientists often see the structural
constraints on action as more significant.
What are the key historical factors that have resulted in successful or failed attempts by movements to enhance the backfire effect of
repressive events? It would also be helpful, as Beyer and Earl suggest
in chapter 5, to learn more about the varying effects of repression on
different levels, such as individuals, networks, SMOs, movements, and
the public as bystanders.
Finally, a more in-depth understanding of the media’s role in
repression and its backfire would be an essential component of our
effort to understand how the paradox of repression unfolds. Both the
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mainstream and alternative media, along with social media generally,
are key sites for framing contests between elites and insurgents, and we
get some insight into that from the chapter by Beyer and Earl. We look
forward to other scholars and activists understanding and sharing how
repression backfires and movements for change become empowered.
The paradox of repression is a major aspect of the power relationships between authorities and insurgents that has not been fully
researched. In this volume, we have endeavored to present the theoretical foundations of the phenomenon and to investigate the way in
which activists exercise agency by preparing for and managing repression. Careful nonviolent strategy can influence the course of a conflict
by raising the costs of repression, although nonviolent activists and
elites both think about and prepare for repression, choreographing
their actions in relation to their opponents’ actions.
We have joined our contributing authors to expand the frameworks
for further scholarship on this topic by conceptualizing repression and
the ever-changing terrain on which movements and authorities contend, technologically, politically, and culturally. Our contributors have
confirmed that repression often backfires and has profound cultural
and psychological underpinnings, including the fundamental generation of fear (which nonviolent activists work to overcome), the psychological costs of repression for perpetrators, moments of transformative
awakening, and the many resources that movements and elites may
draw on for hegemonic or liberatory purposes. We hope that this
deeply collaborative process will help to generate ever more rigorous
scholarship on the topics of repression and backfire, thus broadening
and deepening the use of strategic nonviolent action as an alternative
to more violent forms of conflict.
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